

Message Text

SECRET

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T KUWAIT 0862

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MASS ENRG KU US IZ SA

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR KUWAITI FONMIN ON SECRETARY'S MEETING

WITH COMS IN RIYADH; US-KUWAITI MILITARY RELATIONS;

IRAQ; CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE

1. ARAB-ISRAEL. I MET WITH KUWAITI FONMIN SABAH AL-AHMAD FEB 22 TO CONVEY SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO COMS IN RIYADH ON CURRENT STATUS OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. I SPOKE OF SECRETARY'S DETERMINATION TO MOVE AHEAD DESPITE MASSIVE PROBLEMS AND HIS GUARDED OPTIMISM THAT PROGRESS CAN INDEED BE MADE IN NEXT MONTH OR TWO. I EMPHASIZED SECRETARY'S BELIEF IN STEP BY STEP APPROACH, WHICH NECESSARY NOT ONLY IN MIDEAST CONTEXT BUT IN CONSIDERATION OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC REALITIES AS WELL. I ALSO MADE CLEAR FACT THAT FOCUS OF PRIMARY EFFORT IS CURRENTLY ON EGYPT SHOULD IN NO WAY BE INTERPRETED AS INTENTION TO SPLIT ARABS. SECRETARY, I SAID, KNEW IN DEPTH VIEWS AND NEEDS OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AND NOT A SINGLE FACTOR OF THE WHOLE COMPLEX FORMULA WOULD BE LEFT OUT. FINALLY, I CONVEYED SECRETARY'S VIEW GENEVA CONFERENCE LIKELY WIND UP IN HARMFUL STALEMATE IF CONDITIONS CON-

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DUCIVE TO ITS SUCCESS NOT REASONABLY WELL ESTABLISHED BEFOREHAND.

2. FONMIN SABAH SAID HE VERY PLEASED TO HAVE THESE LATEST VIEWS OF SECRETARY. HE PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED TO HEAR OF SECRETARY'S DETERMINATION NOT TRY TO SPLIT ARABS; THIS THOUGHT NOT NEW TO HIM BUT HE GLAD TO HEAR IT REITERATED AS SECRETARY MOVED INTO HIGH GEAR IN COMING WEEKS ON EGYPTIAN FRONT. IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS IF ARABS BECAME CONVINCED US INTENTION WAS TO DIVIDE THEM. ONLY OTHER POINT HE WISHED MAKE, SABAH SAID, WAS TO STRONGLY URGE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT SECRETARY FIND SOME WAY TO INCLUDE PLO AT GENEVA CONFERENCE. "ARABS CANNOT DO ANYTHING IN GENEVA WITHOUT INCLUSION OF PLO", FONMIN OBSERVED, "AND GENEVA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT PLO THERE." FONMIN ADDED HE HAD MADE SAME POINT TO UN SECGEN WALDHEIM.

3. IN ANSWER MY QUESTION ON RECENT VISIT OF SYRIAN FONMIN, SABAH SAID SYRIANS WERE ANXIOUS THAT FELLOW ARABS UNDERSTOOD THEIR POSITION. SYRIANS WERE ASKING "HOW ARE WE GOING TO GET OUR LAND BACK WHEN ISRAELIS GO RIGHT ON BUILDING THEIR KIBBUTZES ON IT?" AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, SABAH SAID, SYRIANS DID NOT APPEAR WORRIED THAT SECRETARY VIEWED SYRIA AS LESS THAN A VITAL ELEMENT OF HIS PEACE EFFORTS.

4. US-KUWAITI MILITARY RELATIONS. I TOLD FONMIN SABAH (AS I HAD KUWAITI MINDEF SAAD SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER) THAT I HAD RAISED WITH SECRETARY US ROLE IN ASSISTING KUWAIT WITH ITS DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND THAT SECRETARY HAD ASSURED ME IT WAS USG POLICY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO DEMONSTRABLE KUWAITI MILITARY NEEDS. SECRETARY HAD ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS NOT A CARTE BLANCHE COMMITMENT; WE WOULD PURSUE WITH OUR BEST EFFORTS THOSE PROGRAMS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON, BUT IT HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS POWERFUL OPPOSITION IN THE US TO AMERICAN MILITARY SALES AND ADVISORY EFFORTS ABROAD, AND THIS OPPOSITION COULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE AN EFFECT ON WHAT WE WERE ABLE TO DO. NEVERTHELESS THE MAIN MESSAGE WAS THAT USG AS MATTER OF POLICY WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS IT COULD. FONMIN REPLIED HE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS ASSURANCE WHICH MINDEF HAD ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO CROWN PRINCE/PM JABIR AL-AHMAD.

5. US-IRAQI RELATIONS. I TOLD FONMIN I HAD RAISED SUBJECT OF US RELATIONS WITH IRAQ IN RIYADH AND HAD GIVEN SECRETARY ME ASSESS-
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MENT THAT KUWAIT WOULD WELCOME IMPROVED US-IRAQI RELATIONS. FONMIN SABAH SAID US IRAQI RAPPROCHMENT NOT ONLY VERY MUCH IN KUWAIT'S INTEREST BUT IN INTEREST ALL COUNTRIES OF THIS AREA INCLUDING IRAN. HE OPINED IRAQIS WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO APPROACH BY US. I REPLIED THAT, BASED ON INFORMAL CONTACTS WE HAD MADE IN RECENT MONTHS, THAT WAS NOT RPT NOT OUR IMPRESSION, AND OF COURSE WE NOT ABOUT TO CHASE AFTER IRAQIS. SABAH INDICATED FULL UNDERSTANDING. NEVERTHELESS HE SAID HE STILL BELIEVED IRAQI

REGIME -- A NARROWLY BASED ONE -- WOULD WELCOME CLOSER CONTACT WITH USG IF SCENARIO WAS "RIGHT." I SAID USG NOT PUSHING MATTER BUT WOULD NOT TURN ITS BACK ON PROMISING OPPORTUNITIES INCREASE CONTACTS WITH GOI.

6. CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE. I TOLD FONMIN I WAS GLAD HE HAD HAD OPPORTUNITY TALK TO UNDERSECRETARY ROBINSON (AT LUNCH FOR UNSECGEN WALDHEIM) LAST WEEK. UNDERSEC ROBINSON'S MISSION, I SAID, OBVIOUSLY WAS TO CONSULT WITH PRODUCERS IN EFFORT IDENTIFY THOSE SUBJECTS FOR CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE AGENDA THAT WOULD ENSURE PRODUCTIVE MULTINATIONAL MEETING. USG EFFORTS AT PRESENT DESIGNED MAXIMIZE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF MEETING, WHICH WAS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF CONFRONTATION US SEEMINGLY BEING ACCUSED OF THESE DAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY FRONT. WITH JAW SET FONMIN REPLIED KUWAIT, AS MEMBER OPEC, NOT PREPARED TALK AT ANY CONFERENCE ABOUT OIL ONLY -- EVEN IF USG DID THINK TALKING ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE WAS WASTE OF ITS TIME. GOK HAD ACCEPTED FRENCH PROPOSAL BECAUSE "FRENCH AGENDA IS CLEAR." OPEC COUNTRIES NOT TRYING TO DESTROY EUROPE. OPEC READY TO TALK. EUROPE NEEDED OPEC PRODUCERS AND PRODUCERS NEEDED EUROPE. US NOT IN SAME DIMENSION OF DEPENDENCY IN THIS CONTEXT, AND US APPROACH TO CONFERENCE SO FAR WAS NOT IN INTEREST EUROPE OR OPEC. I REITERATED THAT ROBINSON MISSION WAS CLEAR EARNEST OF US DESIRE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE ENSURE FRUITFUL CONSUMER/PRODUCER DIALOGUE LEADING TO EVENTUAL CONFERENCE; AND I SAID I HOPED GOK WOULD SEE OUR EFFORTS IN THAT LIGHT.

7. FONMIN SABAH SAID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT SAUDIS HAD INVITED CROWN PRINCE/PM JABIR AL-AHMAD TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA MARCH 8. FONMIN SAID DATE MIGHT SLIP A LITTLE DUE GOK PREOCCUPATION WITH OPEC SUMMIT MARCH 4-6, BUT VISIT NOW DEFINITELY "ON." I GREETED THIS NEWS ENTHUSIASTICALLY.

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8. IN CONCLUSION, FONMIN SPOKE WARMLY OF SECRETARY'S PEACE EFFORTS IN MIDEAST. HE WISHED SECRETARY ALL SUCCESS.
STOLTZFUS

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NNN

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